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Many philosophical approaches hypoth-
esize that one function of consciousness
is the creation of a unified subjective
experience (Baars, 2005; Bayne, 2010).
Such unified experience links different
processing streams, originating in sepa-
rate perceptual modules, thus enabling
common access and generation of inte-
grated decisions. All of this presumably
occurs via a mechanism that blends infor-
mation from different modalities into
a single, multidimensional representa-
tion. But what exactly is unified in
conscious experience? Prevailing expla-
nations focus on integration of spe-
cific stimulus features at a perceptual or
decisional level. In this opinion piece
we discuss a simple but underappreci-
ated explanation that focuses on pro-
cessing dynamics. Specifically, we propose
that cross-modal integration is facilitated
by different modalities having a simi-
lar effect on the global subjective experi-
ence of processing quality. This integrated
experience can then enter into decisional
processes concerned with its source and
relevance for the current behavior. As
such, our account combines “experien-
tial” and “decisional” process. Below we
place this argument in the context of
research on cross-modal integration and
processing experiences, and discuss some
implications.
Traditionally, research on multisen-
sory experiences focuses on integration of
information from different perceptual and
conceptual cues. Some classic examples
of such phenomena include the McGurk
effect (changes in audition as function of
vision; McGurk and MacDonald, 1976)
and the double-flash illusion (changes in
vision as a function of audition; e.g.,
Shams et al., 2000). Other classic exam-
ples of low-level cross-modal interac-
tions include influences between pitch
and brightness, loudness and size, or
pitch and elevation. On a more concep-
tual level, cross-modal influences include
shape or sound symbolism, such as
the “bouba/kiki” effect (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001) and semantically-
driven cases of synesthesia (Mroczko-
Wa¸sowicz and Nikolic, 2014). A lively
debate concerns when individual percep-
tual components from one modality are
mandatorily modified by another modal-
ity, undergoing a low-level fusion that
produces a single integrated percept, or
when they are separate and integrated
in high-level, post-perceptual stages via
decisional processes (Spence, 2011; for an
empirical example, see Hillis et al., 2002).
Importantly, what such studies investigate
are cross-modal influences on the rep-
resentational content related to specific
stimulus features.
Here we propose that cross-modal
influences can also occur via processes
that care less about the specific represen-
tational content but more about general
representational quality, yielding global
processing experiences. This proposal
is grounded in several theoretical and
empirical considerations.
Historically, the basic idea of processing
experiences goes back to William James
(1890) who spoke of “fringe conscious-
ness” as experience that communicates
a vague, unarticulated sense of periph-
eral contents relevant to the main task.
Some “fringe experiences” include the
feelings of familiarity and knowing, tip-
of-the-tongue phenomena, and the sense
of ease, rightness or coherence. Initially
neglected by cognitive science, processing
experiences and global “quality signals”
are now of interest as a computationally
efficient way of representing rich relational
information (Mangan, 1993; Reber et al.,
2002).
Empirically, the initial evidence for pro-
cessing experiences came from research
on fluency and familiarity (Whittlesea,
2002). For example, a pioneering study
observed that people judge variable back-
ground noise as less loud when they
hear a target word that was previously
studied (Jacoby et al., 1988). Apparently,
the ease (fluency) of target process-
ing, deriving from previous exposure,
gets misattributed to the loudness judg-
ment. A related study reported misattri-
butions of previous exposure to visual
blur judgments (Whittlesea et al., 1990).
Subsequent memory research documented
similar influences using changes in per-
ceptual format between stimuli appear-
ing in the study and test phase of the
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experiment, including crossing words and
pictures (e.g., Fazendeiro et al., 2005).
Critically for the present argument, similar
effects can occur for changes in modality,
such as crossing auditory and visual stim-
ulus presentation at study and test (e.g.,
Curran andDien, 2003;Miller et al., 2008).
These studies suggest that subjective expe-
riences such as “fluency” and “familiarity”
can be amodal and reflect joint influences
from separate modalities. As a result, peo-
ple cannot easily separate the processing
quality associated with the target stimulus
from contextual influences.
An important inspiration for our pro-
posal are findings that a similar subjec-
tive experience can derive from processing
facilitation at different processing stages.
For example, factors that objectively facil-
itate visual detection and visual identifi-
cation have similar effects on feelings of
processing ease (Reber et al., 2004; Wurtz
et al., 2008; but see Reber et al., 2014).
As such, our proposal basically adds that
experiential integration into a unified sub-
jective feeling can occur even when the
sources of processing experiences origi-
nate in different sensory modalities (e.g.,
quality signals from auditory processes can
combine with quality signals from visual
processes).
Importantly, our proposal assumes that
experiential signals of processing quality
can originate in processing of abstract,
conceptual material, and extend beyond
fluency (sense of ease) and familiar-
ity (sense of oldness) to “structural
experiences,” such as a sense of coher-
ence, integrity, or rightness (Whittlesea,
2002). One example comes from research
using artificial grammars and shows that
decisions about grammaticality in one
modality are influenced by previously
learned grammatical rules in another
modality, and that this influence involves
non-analytical processes (Dienes et al.,
2011). Importantly, this effect may not
involve a feeling of fluency or familiar-
ity, but rather a sense of structural coher-
ence (Scott and Dienes, 2010). Stressing
the breadth of such effects, our recent
research shows that decisions about pat-
terns in one modality can be influ-
enced by the coherence of completely
unrelated patterns from another modal-
ity (Ziembowicz et al., 2013). Let us
elaborate as this research illustrates our
core argument. In three experiments
participants judged targets in one sen-
sory modality while being incidentally
exposed to regular or irregular back-
ground stimuli from a different modal-
ity. For example, targets were auditory
melodies and backgrounds were visual fig-
ures, or vice versa. Critically, the specific
regularity of targets and backgrounds was
unrelated—auditory regularity was tone
sequence grammar, visual regularity was
3D realizability. We explored the effect
of cross-modal coherence with different
types of subjective judgments: “regularity”
(Experiment 1), “familiarity” (Experiment
2), and “possibility” (Experiment 3). All
three experiments showed similar results:
the coherence of the background stimulus
influenced the target judgment, regard-
less of judgment type and target modal-
ity. That is, visual and auditory targets
were judged as more “regular,” “famil-
iar,” and “possible” when the incidental
cross-modal backgrounds were coherent.
What are the implications of such
findings? As mentioned, the standard
explanation of cross-modal phenom-
ena assumes changes in representation
of stimulus features, whether driven
by perceptual processes or decisional
processes that integrate cues from dif-
ferent modalities. In contrast, we argue
that cross-modal influences also reflect
integration at the level of processing expe-
riences. We admit the need for direct
evidence that the just discussed cross-
modal studies (including Ziembowicz
et al., 2013) involve changes in subjec-
tive experiences and that their integration
is causally responsible for the obtained
behavioral effects. However, there is good
evidence that related phenomena do
involve “experiences”–i.e., cognitive or
affective feelings. First, participants in
many (though not all) experiments actu-
ally report changes in the feeling of “ease,”
“effort,” “familiarity” or “regularity” asso-
ciated with processing (Schwarz, 2015).
Second, various physiological measures
pick up indicators of changes in experi-
ence, such as positivity associated with
fluent processing (e.g., Winkielman et al.,
2003, 2012). Third, many experiments
show that “bleed-over” or “misattribu-
tion” effects vanish once a person is
provided with an explanation targeting
subjective experience, not unlike classic
studies on misattribution and discounting
of affect or arousal (e.g., Dutton and
Aron, 1974). For example in the pre-
viously mentioned cross-format study
of Fazendeiro et al. (2005), participants
were asked to recognize (old/new) words
and pictures, some of which appeared
earlier as related cross-format stimuli
(essentially serving as semantic primes).
During this recognition task, background
music was played, which for some par-
ticipants was explained as influencing
their “sense of familiarity.” In this con-
dition, participants showed reduced false
recognition judgments for the cross-
format stimuli, presumably reflecting
their discounting of familiarity experi-
ence. Additional evidence for the notion
that participants consciously experience
changes in processing quality comes from
research on hidden semantic coherence
and the intuitive basis of such judg-
ments (Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,b).
Interestingly, this work shows that par-
ticipants cannot report and re-attribute
changing levels of fluency (facilitation
due to semantic coherence) but are only
aware of affective (hedonic) consequences
of changed fluency. This suggests that
what specifically is “felt” about objective
processing quality varies depending on
the details of the task. Finally, the just
mentioned studies again highlight that
the integration at the level of subjec-
tive experience interacts with high-level
decisional processes. That is, the exact
impact of experience on stimulus judg-
ments depends on the perceiver’s beliefs
about the sources and relevance of the
experience for the task at hand (Schwarz,
2015).
Neuroscientifically, our “joint quality
signal” explanation for cross-modal inte-
gration matches evidence for global con-
flict signals or global prediction error (e.g.,
Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Friston,
2010; Shackman et al., 2011; Botvinick
and Braver, 2015). Computationally, our
account fits with connectionist mod-
els using global signals of processing
quality (Lewenstein and Nowak, 1989;
Norman and O’Reilly, 2003; Cleeremans
and Dienes, 2008). Critically, these signals
are non-specific, with different sources
of coherence, ease, or familiarity generat-
ing a similar signal. Further, these signals
are free-floating—not tightly bound to
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the original representation, and thus
transferable across contents. Still, the sig-
nals are useful. They highlight abstract
correspondences across patterns (e.g.,
regularity). They also regulate the net-
work’s own behavior, terminating the
recognition process (preventing pattern
discovery) when coherence is low and
letting recognition continue when coher-
ence is high (Rychwalska et al., 2005). The
specifics of the mechanisms can be illus-
trated using a model by Lewenstein and
Nowak (1989). It is a Hopfield type neu-
ral network enhanced with a mechanism
allowing the network to control its own
processing dynamics. The controlling sys-
tem is implemented as a feedback loop that
draws on one of a set of parameters: coher-
ence, volatility, signal strength, etc. Based
on the momentary values of this “order
parameter,” the system can distinguish
between known and unknown stim-
uli, but also react differently to primed,
prototypical, regular, coherent, and dis-
torted material. This model applies well to
behavioral data, as seen in simulations of
the mere exposure effect, which involves
changes in fluency (Drogosz and Nowak,
2006). Consistent with behavioral data,
the network reproduces the asymmetrical
effect of “mere-exposed” stimuli on non-
analytic, implicit, fluency-dependent
judgments (preferences, familiarity) and
analytic, explicit memory judgments.
That is, the network results show that
implicit measures of recognition (using
the dynamic order parameter) can be
faster than explicit measures, recreating
a paradoxical phenomenon of somehow
“knowing” the valence or familiarity of a
stimulus before actually recognizing it.
In sum, we propose that some cross-
modal phenomena involve integration
via common experiences, including flu-
ency, familiarity, and coherence, grounded
in global signals about network dynam-
ics. As a result, even when the modal
origins of such signals differ, individ-
uals experience integrated feelings of
processing quality. Such feelings can
then enter meta-cognitive processes and
inform fundamental cognitive and social
judgments (Winkielman and Schooler,
2011; Schwarz, 2015). Future research
may explore cross-modal influences on
experience-based judgments (risk, fre-
quency, truth, fame, beauty, etc.). It should
also determine when such effects are
pre- and post-decisional. One question
in this regard concerns the level at which
processing signals are combined. It could
be pre-experiential (e.g., fluency sig-
nals could blend before any experience)
or experiential (e.g., with one already
blended, or two blendable feeling sig-
nals appearing in the experience). A
related question is whether experiences
from different sources are genuinely fused
(i.e., their origin information is lost) or
potentially separable. Research should also
explore the specificity of experiences. That
is, sometimes experiences act broadly,
allowing for conflation of drastically dif-
ferent inputs such as physical arousal with
familiarity (Goldinger and Hansen, 2005)
or physical effort with retrieval difficulty
(Stepper and Strack, 1993). But, indi-
vidual processing experiences are also
unique in subjective quality (e.g., feel-
ings of coherence differ from familiarity
or ease, not unlike different emotions).
This should constrain possible experiential
fusion (genuine blending) and judgmental
misattributions (source errors).
In conclusion, it appears that the cre-
ation of a unified consciousness is facil-
itated by an experiential mechanism that
combines signals of processing quality.
This mechanism links diverse contents in
the mind and allows people to experience
the multi-modal world as integrated—
though also sometimes as more (or less)
unified than it actually is.
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